

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 17679 01 OF 03 251633Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----049847 251638Z /43

O 251616Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1874  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 17679

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

AMMAN FOR ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR EG IS  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KAMEL

REF: (A) STATE 187075 (B) AMMAN 6129

1. SUMMARY: GAVE KAMEL GENERAL BRIEFING ON ROY  
ATHERTON'S MEETING WITH SAUD BIN FAYSAL. I THEN SOUGHT  
TO CORRECT KAMEL'S MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT DAYAN  
HAD SAID ABOUT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, BUT DID NOT GET  
ANYWHERE. BOTH KAMEL AND MAHER INSISTED DAYAN HAD MADE  
IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT ISRAEL REQUIRES A TERRITORIAL  
DIMENSION FOR INTERNAL SECURITY. I ALSO REMINDED KAMEL  
THAT HE HAD PROMISED THE SECRETARY THAT GOE WOULD AGREE  
TO ANOTHER MEETING. KAMEL RECALLED HIS COMMITMENT, BUT  
COMMENTED BEGIN HAD MADE THINGS DIFFICULT THROUGH STATE-  
MENTS MADE AFTER LAST ISRAELI CABINET MEETING. WHILE  
ACKNOWLEDGING DIFFERENCES IN TWO SIDES' POSITIONS, I  
REMINDED KAMEL OF POINTS OF COMMONALITY WHICH SHOULD NOT  
BE DISMISSED. KAMEL OPINED THAT WE OVEREMPHASIZE POINTS  
OF COMMONALITY. HE NOTED CRUCIAL ISSUE OF WHAT HAPPENS

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TO WEST BANK/GAZA AFTER TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS STILL UN-  
ANSWERED. KAMEL ALSO QUESTIONED VALUE OF HAVING DEFENSE  
MINISTERS ATTEND ANY NEW CONFERENCE. WEIZMAN IS CERTAIN  
TO BE UNDER DAYAN'S THUMB. MOREOVER, HAVING DEFENSE  
MINISTERS PRESENT WILL PROJECT IMAGE THAT SINAI RATHER  
THAN WEST BANK/GAZA IS BEING DISCUSSED. IF TECHNICAL  
SECURITY ASPECTS OF WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUE HAVE TO BE DIS-

CUSSED, MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE EGYPTIAN EXPERTS THAN GAMASY COULD BE FOUND TO DO SO. KAMEL OPINED WE MUST FIRST FIND REASONABLE BASIS FOR A FURTHER MEETING AND THEREAFTER CONFIGURATION OF SUCH A MEETING COULD BE DECIDED. I POINTED OUT WE ARE SEEKING GET ONGOING NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND, IF WE SUCCEED, I HOPED WE COULD COUNT ON KAMEL TO DO HIS PART, SINCE MORE MEETINGS WILL BE NECESSARY. THIS PROMPTED KAMEL TO COMMENT THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON TYPE OF US SUGGESTIONS THAT ARE EVENTUALLY PUT FORWARD. HE REMAINED WORRIED ABOUT WHAT WE MIGHT SUBMIT. WE AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION WHEN ROY ARRIVES. IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR TALK, KAMEL DEPARTED FOR TOMORROW'S NSC MEETING IN ALEXANDRIA AND WILL LATER IN THE DAY FLY TO AMMAN FOR TALKS. HE WILL RETURN THURSDAY. ROY'S MEETING WITH KAMEL IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR FRIDAY AFTERNOON, WITH POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH SADAT SATURDAY IN ALEXANDRIA FOLLOWING DAY. END SUMMARY

2. MET WITH FONMIN KAMEL THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS VARIOUS MATTERS ARISING FROM LEEDS CONFERENCE. AHMED MAHER WAS WITH HIM. KAMEL PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR MEETING IN ORDER TO ATTEND TOMORROW'S SPECIAL NSC MEETING. TOMORROW AFTERNOON HE WILL FLY TO AMMAN FOR MEETINGS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND JORDANIAN OFFICIALS BEFORE RETURNING TO CAIRO ON THURSDAY. MAHER WILL ACCOMPANY HIM.

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3. AT KAMEL'S REQUEST, I FIRST BRIEFED HIM ON ROY'S REPORT TO SAUD BIN FAYSAL ON THE LEEDS TALKS. SINCE I DID NOT HAVE DETAILED REPORT, I UTILIZED POINTS MADE REF B. TOLD HIM THAT ROY MENTIONED TO SAUD BIN FAYSAL OUR IDEA FOR ANOTHER EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI/US MEETING, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT INDICATE GOE HAS ACCEPTED THIS IDEA. KAMEL WAS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING SAUD BIN FAYSAL'S REACTION, WHICH I PROMISED TO CONVEY AS SOON AS FULLER REPORT AVAILABLE.

4. I THEN SOUGHT TO CORRECT KAMEL'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT DAYAN HAD SAID AT LEEDS ABOUT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, UTILIZING POINTS MADE IN REFTELS. I FRANKLY GOT NOWHERE. BOTH KAMEL AND MAHER INSISTED THAT DAYAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL, NOT ONLY DURING BUT ALSO AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, REQUIRES A TERRITORIAL DIMENSION FOR SECURITY. HE DID NOT SEE HOW THERE COULD BE ANY DISAGREEMENT THAT THIS HAD BEEN DAYAN'S POINT AND THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE ALLON PLAN HAD BEEN MADE IN THAT CONTEXT. MAHER INSISTED THAT ALL MEMBERS OF EGYPTIAN DELEGATION CAME AWAY FROM LEEDS

TALKS WITH THIS CLEAR IMPRESSION. KAMEL EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT US DELEGATION HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD DAYAN'S COMMENTS THIS WAY. AFTER LENGTHY, INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION, KAMEL FINALLY SAID THAT WE MUST OBVIOUSLY MAKE OUR OWN INTERPRETATION OF DAYAN'S PERTINENT COMMENTS. EVEN UNDER OUR INTERPRETATION, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SEE HOW THIS MADE THE ISRAELI POSITION ANY MORE POSITIVE. I TRIED TO POINT OUT TO HIM THAT OUR UNDER-

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1875  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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STANDING OF THE PRESENT ISRAELI POSITION, WHICH IS DOUBTLESS A HARD ONE, COULD IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST GREATER FUTURE FLEXIBILITY THAN NOW SEEMS TO BE THE CASE. KAMEL SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND SAID THAT HE HOPED SO. IN HIS VIEW, HOWEVER, DAYAN HAD AT LEAST MADE ISRAELI TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INDISPUTABLY CLEAR.

5. WE THEN TALKED ABOUT A FOLLOW-ON MEETING AND I REMINDED KAMEL THAT HE HAD PROMISED THE SECRETARY THAT GOE WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A MEETING SHORTLY BEFORE OR WHEN THE SECRETARY COMES. I KNEW THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC POSITION THAT NO FURTHER MEETING HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, BUT I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT WE ARE CLEAR AMONG OURSELVES THAT SUCH IS NEEDED AND INTENDED. KAMEL RECALLED HIS COMMITMENT, BUT COMMENTED THAT BEGIN HAD MADE THINGS VERY DIFFICULT AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENT AFTER LAST CABINET MEETING. KAMEL FRANKLY WONDERED WHAT THERE WILL BE TO TALK ABOUT. THE ISRAELIS HAVE REJECTED THE EGYPTIAN PLAN AND GOE

REJECTS THE BEGIN PLAN. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO SIDES' POSITIONS, AS DEMONSTRATED AT LEEDS, I REMINDED KAMEL OF THE POINTS OF SECRET

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COMMONALITY. THESE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AND BOTH PARTIES, WITH OUR HELP, SHOULD SEEK TO BUILD ON THEM. KAMEL OPINED THAT WE OVEREMPHASIZE THE POINTS OF COMMONALITY. WHAT IS CRUCIAL AND STILL UNANSWERED, HE CONTENDED, IS WHAT HAPPENS TO THE WEST BANK/GAZA AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE ISRAELI REPLIES TO OUR TWO QUESTIONS HAD NOT BEEN REASSURING ON THIS SCORE, NOR HAD DAYAN'S COMMENTS AT LEEDS ABOUT A TERRITORIAL DIMENSION FOR SECURITY MADE THE TASK ANY EASIER.

6. KAMEL THEN RAISED OUR IDEA OF HAVING THE DEFENSE MINISTERS ATTEND SUCH A CONFERENCE. HE SAW LITTLE PURPOSE TO THIS IDEA. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE TWO REASONS WHY A JOINT FOD/DEF MINS MEETING MIGHT BE USEFUL: (A) SECURITY ASPECTS WILL INEVITABLY ARISE; AND (B) IT WILL ENABLE WEIZMAN, WHOM THE EGYPTIANS AGREE WANTS A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT, TO REENGAGE HIMSELF IN THE PEACE PROCESS. KAMEL REMAINED SKEPTICAL. HE CONTENDED THAT AT ANY SUCH MEETING, WEIZMAN WILL BE TOTALLY SUBORDINATE TO DAYAN. MOREOVER, SUCH A MEETING WILL GIVE THE ARABS THE IMPRESSION THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE ON THE SINAI WHEN IN FACT IT IS WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUES THAT ARE BEING DISCUSSED. BEGIN'S MESSAGE TO SADAT, AS PUBLISHED BY THE ISRAELIS, WILL STRENGTHEN THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS SINAI THAT WILL BE DISCUSSED. HERE KAMEL PERSONALLY LAMENTED SADAT'S SUGGESTION OF AL-ARISH/MOUNT SINAI ENCLAVES. IF SECURITY EXPERTS ARE REQUIRED, HE ARGUED, MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ONES OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA TERRAIN THAN GAMASY CAN BE FOUND ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. IF WEIZMAN IS NOT INCLUDED, KAMEL THOUGHT, HE CAN BE SAVED FOR SOME FUTURE, CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. BEGIN CANNOT LIVE FOREVER. I SAID THAT ALL OF SECRET

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US HAVE TO WORK WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN OFFICE, WHICH MEANS BEGIN, AND THAT IT IS OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO DO SO. KAMEL AGREED AND NOTED THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE BEGIN TO STAY ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. BEGIN, KAMEL ASSERTED, IS "OUR GREATEST ASSET" IN TERMS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS.

7. KAMEL THEN SAID THAT WE MUST FIRST FIND A REASON-  
ABLE BASIS FOR ANOTHER MEETING. THEREAFTER, ONCE THIS  
HAS BEEN FOUND, THE CONFIGURATION OF SUCH A MEETING  
CAN BE DECIDED UPON. HE WANTED TO BE CLEAR, HOWEVER,  
THAT THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE THE LAST ONE. I AGREED  
THAT A REASONABLE BASIS MUST BE FOUND FOR ANOTHER  
MEETING, AFTER WHICH A DECISION CAN BE MADE WHETHER  
THE MILITARY SHOULD ATTEND, BUT POINTED OUT TO KAMEL  
THAT WE SHOULD ALL WORK TOGETHER TO GET AN ONGOING  
NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED. IF WE SUCCEED, THIS WILL  
REQUIRE MORE MEETINGS AND I HOPED WE COULD COUNT UPON  
KAMEL TO DO HIS PART.

8. THIS PROMPTED KAMEL TO COMMENT THAT EVERYTHING  
DEPENDS UPON THE TYPE OF US SUGGESTIONS THAT ARE  
EVENTUALLY PUT FORWARD. HE DID NOT WISH US TO PUT  
FORWARD A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, I.E., BETWEEN EGYPTIAN  
AND ISRAELI POSITIONS, FROM WHICH THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATED AN EVEN GREATER COMPROMISE. ANYTHING WE PUT FORWARD SHOULD BE AT LEAST "99 PERCENT" EGYPTIAN IDEAS AND HE RECALLED THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT TO HIM THAT OUR IDEAS WILL BE CLOSE TO THE EGYPTIAN ONES. IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE, KAMEL ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHY SHOULD EGYPT NEGOTIATE? THE MATTER COULD BE TAKEN TO UNSC.

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1876  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
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EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

9. I SAID THAT KAMEL HAD TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT ANY  
SUGGESTIONS WE MAY PUT FORWARD WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO  
ACCOUNT THE VIEWS AND INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. I

DOUBTED THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SATISFY FULLY  
EITHER SIDE. BUT HE SHOULD KNOW THAT ANY SUGGESTIONS  
WE PUT FORWARD WILL REPRESENT OUR BEST JUDGMENT ON  
WHAT IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE. KAMEL REMAINED WORRIED  
AND SIMPLY SAID HE HOPED SO.

10. WE AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION WHEN ROY ARRIVES.  
WHEN I TOLD SADAT YESTERDAY THAT ROY IS COMING ON  
FRIDAY, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE MEET WITH HIM ON SATURDAY  
IN ALEXANDRIA. I MENTIONED THIS TO KAMEL, BUT KAMEL  
IS INSISTENT THAT WE MEET WITH HIM (AND PERHAPS SOME  
OF HIS LEGAL EXPERTS) BEFORE THERE IS ANY MEETING WITH  
SADAT. WE ARE TENTATIVELY THINKING OF A MEETING WITH  
KAMEL FRIDAY AFTERNOON. THIS IS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMA-  
TION AFTER KAMEL'S RETURN FROM AMMAN ON THURSDAY.  
EILTS

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SECURITY, POLICIES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, MILITARY OCCUPIED AREAS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, PEACE TALKS, CAT-B  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Subject:** MEETING WITH KAMEL  
**TAGS:** PEPR, PREL, PDIP, MPOL, PBOR, US, IS, EG, (KAMEL, MOHAMMED IBRAHIM), (MAHER, AHMED), (EILTS, HERMANN F)  
**To:** STATE AMMAN MULTIPLE  
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